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Abstract
The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (hereinafter the “Directive”) 
was passed in 1995 to harmonise the national data protection laws 
within the European Community with the aim of protecting the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals including their 
privacy as set out under Art. 1 of the Data Protection Directive. The 
rules governing the processing of personal data are deemed to be 
inapplicable in the two instances outlined by Art.3(2). Processing of 
personal data taking place as part of activities falling outside of 
Community law are excluded from the DPD. The Directive is also 
deemed to be inapplicable if the processing of personal data is 
undertaken by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or 
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household activity. It is the second part of Art. 3(2), which is 
examined in more detail. The ruling by the European Court of Justice 
in Lindqvist provides us with a fresh opportunity to re-examine 
whether the policy justifications for the exclusion under Art 3(2) 
continue to remain relevant in the light of widespread use of new 
technologies such as blogs, podcasts and web pages for processing 
and distributing information. Greater clarity regarding the 
implication of new communication technologies for DPD policy is 
necessary if the laws on data protection are to evolve in a coherent 
and principled manner.
Keywords: Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC; internet, private 
purposes, blogs, podcasts
I. Introduction
The exponential growth of social networking websites, online personal 
journals and the use of multimedia by individuals raises important 
questions about the compatibility of Art. 3(2) of the Data Protection 
95/46/EC (hereinafter the “DPD”) as applied to the internet. Whilst it is 
true that the provisions in the DPD were designed to mediate between the 
rights of the freedom to expression and privacy, it is not entirely clear 
whether the premises informing the scope of Article 3(2)3 can be insisted 
upon in the light of the transformation taking place. Private individuals 
now assume a central role in the collection, processing and distribution of 
data. This article uses the ruling by the European Court of Justice in
Lindqvist4 as a framework for evaluating two key issues raised by the 
emergence of new social spaces for processing and disseminating 
information. First, it is not entirely clear from the emerging post-Lindqvist
jurisprudence whether the extension of Article 3(2) may necessarily 
undermine the fundamental principle of fairness and ultimately the 
                                                
3 Article 3(2) of the Data Protection Directive provides that the Directive
is deemed to be inapplicable in two instances. Firstly, the processing of personal 
data taking place as part of activities falling outside of Community law are 
excluded from the DPD. Secondly, the Directive is also deemed to be inapplicable 
if the processing of personal data is undertaken by a natural person in the course of 
a purely personal or household activity. It is the second part of Art. 3(2), which is 
examined in more detail.
4 C-101/01 [2004] 1 CMLR 20.
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coherence of the data protection legislation.5 Second, whether alternative 
regulatory instruments may enable the DPD to continue with its legal 
standard setting role. Two conclusions are reached in this paper. First, that 
it would be premature to extend the scope of Article 3(2). Second, the 
future standard setting role of DPD must now embrace the emerging reality 
of a gradual convergence between systems of social interaction and systems 
of technological innovation.
II. Lindqvist: Balancing the Freedom of Expression 
and Rights of Privacy
New communication technologies and the Internet compel us to assess 
whether an optimal balance is currently maintained between the rights of 
expression and privacy. The ECJ ruling in Lindqvist can be seen as 
providing an apt illustration of the factors that must be taken into account 
when seeking to find a balance between the rights of privacy and freedom 
of expression.
Before turning to the ECJ ruling, some account of the regulatory 
framework governing the processing of personal data under the DPD may 
be pertinent. The aim here is not to undertake an exhaustive analysis of the 
jurisprudence of this subject6 but to highlight the rationale and organising 
principles. The point here is that the standard setting function of DPD 
cannot be properly understood without some familiarity with the organising 
principles that assist the ECJ in balancing the competing claims made by 
litigants. The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (hereinafter “DPD”) was 
passed in 1995 to harmonise the laws on data protection within the 
European Community. It required EU Member States to implement 
legislation by 25 October 1998.7 This DPD is further supplemented by the 
                                                
5 By data protection legislation, we are principally referring to the Data 
Protection Directive  95/46/EC and the EU countries’ implementation of the Data 
Protective Protection 95/46/EC.
6 For an analysis of the data protection laws, see LEE A. BYGRAVE.  
DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND 
LIMITS (London: Kluwer, 2002); CHRISTOPHER KUNER. EUROPEAN DATA 
PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003); Rosemayr Jay & Angus Hamilton. Data protection: law and practice, 2nd
ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003).
7 On the transposition of the DPD by EU Member States, see 
PRIVIREAL. Data Protection – by country at http://www.privireal.org/ and 
DERYCK BEYLEVELD. (ET. AL.) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DATA 
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE IN RELATION TO MEDICAL RESEARCH IN 
EUROPE (London: Ashgate, 2004); European Commission. Status of 
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Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC 
(hereinafter “DPEC”), which applies to the processing of personal 
information carried out ‘in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications service in public communications 
networks in the Community’ (Art. 3(1) DPD).8  For the purposes of this 
paper, the authors will consider the latter half of Art. 3(2) of the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC. The following principles9 can be said to be 
key in the mediatory role of the DPD in balancing the competing interests 
between ‘data controllers’ and data subjects in respect of the processing of 
personal data. These are:
a. Fairness;
b. Lawfulness;
c. Specificity;
d. Adequacy
e. Accuracy
f. Non-excessiveness
g. Accessibility to the data subject
These principles can be viewed as performing a standard setting function in 
the sense that the activities of ‘data controllers’ are now brought within a 
centralized regulatory framework designed to achieve transparency, 
accountability and consistency in the application of the rules governing the 
collection, processing and distribution of data. The obligations imposed by 
the DPD on data controllers in specified circumstances can serve as an 
illustration of the standard setting process, in particular, the interplay of the 
principles of fairness and considerations of efficiency. For example, in 
relation to matters involving the processing of sensitive information 
relating to sex, health and race, explicit consent must be obtained from 
                                                                                                                
implementation of Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data
(http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm), Last 
accessed 20 March 2007.
8
For an analysis of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications 2002/58/EC see also CHRISTOPHER KUNER. EUROPEAN 
DATA PRIVACY LAW: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND REGULATION, 2nd
ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
9 See in particular Art. 7 on the data protection principles laid down under 
the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Art. 7 of the DPD provide six 
criterion in which personal data can be processed legitimately. These include the 
(a) data subject’s unambiguous consent (b) where this was necessary for the 
performance of a contract or at the request of the data subject prior to entering into 
a contract (c) compliance with a legal obligation etc.
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the subject.10 This requirement is relaxed where the processing is 
seen as necessary to enable the data controller to comply with 
obligations imposed by national laws or where the controller has 
legitimate interests in processing the data. The issues of explicit and 
implicit consent lie at the core of the standard setting role. The 
intention here is that data controllers will assume a primary role in 
establishing self-regulation processes that mirror the goals of the 
DPD. 
Art. 3(2) of the DPD can also be seen as embracing the goals of 
legitimacy and efficiency. The former corresponds with the 
expectation of citizens that exercises of authority conform with 
constitutional norms and principles. The latter is consonant with the 
idea that legitimate governance is alive to considerations of 
employing strategies that promote compliance. The enactment 
provides that the obligations relating to the processing of personal 
data are inapplicable in two specific circumstances. First, in 
situations where the processing of personal data falls outside the 
scope of Community law. Second, and particularly relevant to the 
present paper, is the exemption from the DPD obligations where a 
natural person in the course of a purely personal or household 
activity undertakes the processing of personal data. The decision to 
exempt the obligations can be approached from two levels. First, at a 
constitutional level, any encroachment into the private social spaces 
would be seen as unjustified and contrary to prevailing social norms 
and values. At a regulatory level, it is not feasible for the State or its 
enforcement authorities to secure compliance with the obligations. 
We can get a glimpse of these ideas in the deliberations of the ECJ in 
the leading case of Lindqvist.11 The facts can be briefly recounted. L 
had uploaded a web page containing details about members of a 
Parish Church. The website also contained information about a 
member, who had injured her foot. L did not obtain the consent of 
                                                
10 The DPD does not define what “explicit” consent is and there are 
different interpretations from EU Member States on this. The German Federal Data 
Protection (BDSG) requires written consent before sensitive data can be processed. 
UK, however, does not require written consent to process sensitive data, so express 
consent (even given orally) will be sufficient, provided it is clear. See also 
PRIVIREAL: Recommendations around “explicit consent”
(http://www.privireal.org/content/recommendations/#Rece), Last accessed April 
2007.
11  C-101/01 Lindqvist [2004] 1 CMLR 20.
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the individuals before posting the information on the website. L also 
failed to inform the Swedish Data Inspection Board, as to the 
publication of the sensitive information regarding the health of the 
members of the Parish on the website. There is no doubt that the 
courts are well aware of the potential collision between Articles 8 
and 10 of the ECHR. What is particularly interesting about the 
approach adopted by the ECJ is that there is no presumption of 
Article 3(2) applying in actions for breach of the Directive. As the 
ECJ makes clear, it will not be enough for an individual to lay claim 
to a defence of reasonableness or the fact that there is a “de minimis” 
rule as to what constitutes personal data or whether the processing is 
wholly or partly the product of an automated process. This much can 
be gleaned from emphasis placed by the court on whether the 
circumstances involving L were within the scope of the exemption 
stipulated in Article 3(2). Whilst it may be seen as reasonable for 
individuals to discuss events surrounding the parish church in the 
setting of a living room, the public aspect of the publication on the 
events on the Internet, was regarded by the ECJ as meriting sanction. 
To put it another way, the rights of privacy cannot be overridden by 
individuals relying on the defence of personal use and the freedom of 
expression12 as sufficient cause. Another observation that can be 
made about the ECJ’s approach is that any future attempts by 
individuals will not be permitted to treat their rights of expression as 
absolute. The converse here is that at a policy level, the approach 
adopted by the ECJ suggests that the public interest in preserving 
privacy should not be ignored in the age of new communication 
technologies. Finally, it should be noted that the ECJ was not saying 
that the content of the type published was prohibited, but only that 
the subjects identified on L’s website deserved to have their wishes 
of privacy respected or at the least that they deserved the right to be 
consulted and the opportunity to determine the publication of the 
information. The ECJ held that:
Thus, it is, rather, at the stage of the application at national level of the 
legislation implementing Directive 95/46 in individual cases that a 
balance must be found between the rights and interests 
involved...Consequently, it is for the authorities and courts of the Member 
                                                
12 Freedom of expression is covered under Art. 9 of the DPD, which 
provides that ‘Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the 
provisions of this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing of 
personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of the 
artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to 
privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.’
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States not only to interpret their national law in a manner consistent with 
Directive 95/46 but also to make sure they do not rely on an interpretation 
of it which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by 
the Community legal order or with the other general principles of 
Community law, such as inter alia the principle of proportionality.  
Whilst it is true that the protection of private life requires the application 
of effective sanctions against people processing personal data in ways 
inconsistent with Directive 95/46, such sanctions must always respect the 
principle of proportionality. That is so a fortiori since the scope of 
Directive 95/46 is very wide and the obligations of those who process 
personal data are many and significant…The answer to the sixth question 
must therefore be that the provisions of Directive 95/46 do not, in 
themselves, bring about a restriction which conflicts with the general 
principles of freedom of expression or other freedoms and rights, which 
are applicable within the European Union and are enshrined inter alia in 
Article 10 of the ECHR. It is for the national authorities and courts 
responsible for applying the national legislation implementing Directive 
95/46 to ensure a fair balance between the rights and interests in 
question, including the fundamental rights protected by the Community 
legal order (emphasis added).13
In submissions made by the Swedish and the Netherlands 
Government during the Court Proceedings in Lindqvist, they took the 
view that Art. 3(2) should not apply to instances involving the 
publication of personal information on the internet.
The Swedish Government contended that Art. 3(2) did not exempt 
individuals who publish personal information to an indeterminate 
number of people on the internet.14  Similarly, the Netherlands 
Government took the same view holding that exceptions provided 
under Art. 3(2) did not apply and that the ‘creator of an internet page 
brings [sic] the data placed on it to the knowledge of a generally 
indeterminate group of people.’15
The question is whether Lindqvist was able to use the Swedish 
exemption as provided under s 6 of the Personal Data Act 1998?16
                                                
13 Lindqvist, supra,  note 11, at paras. 85-90.
14  C-101/01, para. 31. 
15 Id.. at para. 32.
16
s 6 of the Swedish Personal Data Act 1998 provides that the PDA is not 
applicable to ‘processing of personal data that a natural person performs in the 
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The ECJ held that the exception must ‘be interpreted as relating only 
to activities which are carried out in the course of private or family 
life of individuals, which is clearly not the case with the processing 
of personal data consisting in publication on the internet so that 
those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people
(emphasis added).’
Whilst the ECJ decision clarifies the extent to which individuals may 
be able to benefit from Art. 3(2), when placing personal information 
on the internet, it however, raises several questions.  If it is accepted 
that limiting access of an individual’s webpage to family members 
will be exempt from Art. 3(2) DPD such that the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC does not apply, where does one draw the line for 
individuals whose webpages may extend beyond family members? 
For example, Joe Blogs runs a personal webpage highlighting 
environmental concerns17 and limits access to a group of 
environmental activists? Would Art. 3(2) DPD then apply on the 
basis that Joe was running his webpage for personal purposes? From 
the analysis of Lindqvist, the onus would be on the individual to 
show that the webpage was intended to be used for private purposes, 
which appears to be a harder threshold to prove. 
Although it could be argued that the ECJ took a narrow approach to 
the interpretation of Art. 3(2) as applied to the internet, the 
implications of this decision are that a distinction is drawn between 
private and public access on the internet. Art. 3(2) of the DPD places 
an onus on individuals to limit access of their webpages to a defined 
group before they could benefit and this can be problematic, when 
applied to blogs/podcasts (aside from the technological solutions that 
are available). 
Recital 12 further assists with the interpretation of Art. 3(2) of the 
DPD:
Whereas there should be excluded the processing of data carried out 
by a natural person in the exercise of activities which are exclusively 
personal or domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of 
records of addresses…
                                                                                                                
course of activities of a purely private nature.’ See also the Swedish Personal Data 
Act 1998 at http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/01/55/42/b451922d.pdf.  
17  This is a hypothetical example. 
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Clearly, it appears that Art. 3(2) is to be construed narrowly in the 
light of the ECJ’s decision in Lindqvist, but such a narrow 
interpretation raises certain questions.  
III. Implications arising from Lindqvist
In this section, we explore the main implications arising from 
Lindqvist decision and the effect of the decision it has had on several 
EU Member States in their decision making policies towards data 
protection.
A. Legislative differences between Member States’ data protection 
laws to the implementation of Art. 3.2 DPD to the internet. Based on 
where the individual is located, there are likely to be differences in 
the interpretation and the application of Art. 3(2) as implemented by 
Member States data protection laws.  The salient features of the 
national data protection laws are described as follows:
A1 UK
The UK Data Protection Act 1998 replaces the 1984 Data Protection 
Act and was passed to implement the DPD. It took effect on 1 March 
2000. To date, changes have been made to the UK DPA 1998 
through the FOIA 2000 including the definition of data and the 
change of the supervisory authority’s name.  A few preliminary 
points concerning the definitions of “data” and “personal data”. Data 
is defined under s 1 DPA 1998 as  ‘information which:
(a) is being processed by means of equipment 
operating automatically in response to instruments 
given for that purpose,
(b) is recording with the intention that it should be 
processed by means of such equipment,
(c) is recorded as part of a relevant filing system or 
with the intention that it should form part of a 
relevant filing system,
Forthcoming John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 2007/8
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(d) does not fall within paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) but 
form part of an accessible record as defined by s 
68,18
(e) is recorded information held by a public authority 
and does not fall within any of paragraphs (a) to 
(d).
19
Personal data is defined under s 1 of the DPA as:
Data which relate to a living individual who can be identified:
(a) from those data; or
(b) from those data and other information which is in 
the possession of, or is likely to come into the 
possession of, the data controller, and includes any 
expression of opinion about the individual and any 
indication of the intentions of the data controller or 
any other person in respect of that individual;
The definition of “personal data” has, however, been narrowly 
restricted in the recent Court of Appeal’s decision, Durant v FSA,20
which held that:
…not all information retrieved from a computer search against an 
individual’s name or unique identifier is personal data within the 
Act. Mere mention of the data subject in a document held by a data 
controller does not necessarily amount to his personal data. Whether 
it does so in any particular instance depends on where it falls in a 
continuum of relevance or proximity to the data subject as distinct, 
say, from transactions or matters in which he may have been 
involved to a greater or lesser degree. It seems to me that there are 
two notions that may be of assistance. The first is whether the 
information is biographical in a significant sense, that is, going 
beyond the recording of the putative data subject’s involvement in a
matter or an event that has no personal connotations, a life event in 
respect of which his privacy could not be said to be compromised. 
The second one of focus. The information should have the putative 
                                                
18 Accessible record is defined under s 68 as education, health or accessible 
public record and was created under the DPA 1998, but not found in the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC.
19
Added following the FOI Act 2000.
20  [2003] EWCA Civ 1746. 
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data subject as its focus rather than some other person with whom 
he may have been involved or some transaction or event in which he 
may have figured or have had an interest, for example, as in this 
case, an investigation into some other person’s or body’s conduct 
that he may have instigated (emphasis added).
Leaving aside the discussion over whether the interpretation of 
“personal data”21 was correct in the light of the DPD and the recent 
decision by the ECJ in Lindqvist’s, it can be seen that the mere 
mention of an individual on a webpage will not be sufficient to 
constitute “personal data” under the UK Data Protection Act. What 
will be a determining factor is whether an individual’s privacy has 
been compromised and this will have to be balanced with other 
factors such as the freedom of expression as provided under Art. 10 
of the ECHR.
On the discussion of blogs and webpages, there have been relatively 
few cases being brought under the UK DPA 1998, whereby 
individuals have been prosecuted for placing personal information of 
other individuals on their webpages (whether accessible by the 
public on the internet or not). Although it is unclear why this is the 
case, in a recent correspondence with the UK Office of the 
Information Commissioner on the publication of personal 
information on the internet, the following reply was given:
We have in the past received correspondence about data 
published on websites run by private individuals, such as 
amateur genealogy websites and personal home pages. 
Processing in these cases is often exempt from the DPA 
by virtue of the exemption of section 36…There is, 
therefore, no action the Commissioner can take in 
response to such complaints.22
                                                
21 In the context of “personal data”, see also Watts,  M. “Information, data
and personal data - reflections on Durant v. Financial Services Authority” (2006) 
CLSR 22(4), 320-325; EDWARDS, L. TAKING THE “PERSONAL” OUT OF 
PERSONAL DATA: DURANT V FSA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF CCTV, (2004) 1:2 SCRIPT-ED 341, @:
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue2/durant.asp>.
22  Personal correspondence with the UK Information Commissioner’s 
Office on 26th April 2006.
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s 36 of the UK Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) provides that 
personal data processed by an individual only for the purposes of that 
individual’s personal, family or household affairs (including 
recreational purposes) are exempt from the DPA.23 However, there 
are difficulties with reconciling s 36 of the DPA with the ECJ’s 
decision in Lindqvist. To recapitulate, the ECJ held in Lindqvist that:
The act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons and 
identifying them by name or by other means, for instance by giving 
their telephone number or information regarding their working 
conditions and hobbies, constitutes the processing of personal data
wholly or partly by automatic means within the meaning of Article 
3(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (emphasis added).24
Although the ECJ dealt with the subject of processing personal data, 
clearly, there was no question that one was dealing with personal 
information. It is difficult to reconcile the decision in Lindqvist with 
Durant. Whilst Durant seems to take a practical approach to the 
interpretation of “personal data” so that it has the effect of excluding 
trivial cases being brought before the national courts against 
individuals who may make a cursory or passing reference of other 
individuals on their webpages, it does not detract from the line of 
thought that one is still dealing with “personal data” as defined under 
the DPD, if one is referring to individuals on the webpage.  Personal 
data is defined broadly under Art. 2(a) of the DPD as ‘any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
(‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.’
In dealing with personal information, it would have been preferable 
for the Court of Appeal to consider the exemptions provided under 
the UK DPA 1998 (such as special purposes (processing for 
                                                
23 As confirmed through written correspondence with the UK Office of the 
Information Commissioner. 
24 Lindqvist, supra,  note, 11., at para. 19. 
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journalistic, artistic and literary purposes)25 or as provided under ss 
27-29 of the DPA26 rather than rule directly whether the data was 
“personal”.  In limiting the definition of the scope of “personal data”, 
the Court of Appeal’s decision in Durant not only has the difficulty 
of reconciling the decision with Lindqvist (in particular, Art. 8 of the 
DPD, whereby the ECJ interpreted Art. 8 widely such that mere 
mention of someone’s foot was sufficient to constitute the 
“processing” of personal data), but arguably opens itself to the 
criticism that the UK Data Protection is weak by comparison to other 
Member State27 data protection laws that have implemented the Data
Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Limited space does not permit the 
authors to explore the scope of “personal data” in any detail, but 
suffice it to state that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Durant is not 
satisfactory. 
A2 SWEDEN
                                                
25  s 3 DPA 1998 defines “special purposes” which is to be interpreted in the  
light of s 32 of the DPA 1998, journalism, literature and art. 
26  In the UK, the exemptions are covered under ss 27-39 of the DPA 1998. 
These include processing for the purposes of national security (s 28 DPA 1998); 
crime and taxation (s 29 DPA 1998); health, education and social work (s 30 DPA 
1998); regulatory activity (s 31 DPA 1998); journalism, literature and art (s 32 
DPA 1998); research, history and statistics (s 33 DPA 1998); domestic purposes (s 
36 DPA 1998). 
27 See for example, Iceland’s Supreme court’s decision in Ragnhildur 
Guðmundsdóttir v the State of Iceland 151/2003 (also available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland_decision.pdf) and RENATE GERTZ, 
R. "AN ANALYSIS OF THE ICELANDIC SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT 
ON THE HEALTH SECTOR DATABASE ACT", (2004) 1:2 SCRIPT-ed 241, @: 
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue2/iceland.asp>.
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Sweden was the first country to have data protection laws.28 The 
Swedish Personal Data Act (“PDA” hereinafter) implements the 
European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.29 Before looking at 
the relevant provision, a few points to be made about the background 
into the Swedish Data Protection Act,30 When the PDA was enacted, 
it was met with opposition from newspapers and the general public. 
According to Seipel,31 there were three main criticisms levelled at 
the Act. Firstly, it was critiqued for being a serious threat to the 
freedom of speech and civil liberties. Indeed, the opposition was so 
tremendous that academics such as Professor Jacob Palme32 became 
involved in the debate. However, the recent Ramsbro33 decision by 
the Swedish Supreme Court that considered the exemptions provided 
under Art. 9 (as implemented under the Swedish Personal Data Act 
1998) do, in part, address the question of processing for the purposes 
of “journalistic, artistic and literary purposes.”  We will consider this 
subject in more detail later in this article. A second criticism was that 
the DPD was outdated and that the Swedish legislators had to look 
for national solutions based on the regulation of misuse rather than 
adopt an inclusive “processing model” as covered under the DPD. 
                                                
28 For a background into the Swedish developments on data protection, see    
Peter Seipel. “Sweden” In:  Peter Blume. Nordic Data Protection Law, 2001, pp. 
123-151; See Őman, S. Implementing data protection law In: Wahlgren, P. IT
Law, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 2004, 47, p.391; Mathias Klang,  "Technology, 
Speech, Law & Ignorance – The state of free speech in Sweden", Hertfordshire
Law Journal, 1(2), 48-63 (Autumn 2003); DAVID H. FLAHERTY,  
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA AND THE US 
(University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Rebecca Wong, The shape of things to 
come: Swedish developments on the protection of privacy. SCRIPT-ED, 2(2) 107-
124 @: http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol2-1/wong.asp (2005).
29 Id..
30 Id..
31  Peter Seipel. Supra,  note. 28.
32 Jacob Palme . Critical Review of the Swedish Data Act
(http://people.dsv.su.se/~jpalme/society/data-act-analysis.html), Last accessed 
April 2007 and Freedom of Speech, the EU Data Protection Directive and the 
Swedish Personal Data Act  (http://people.dsv.su.se/~jpalme/society/eu-data-
directive-freedom.html), Last accessed April 2007.
33   B-293-00, June 2001. 
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The changes to the PDA to adopt a misuse-orientated approach has 
now taken effect from January 2007.34, 35
s 6 of the PDA 1998 provides that:
This Act does not apply to such processing of personal data that a 
natural person performs in the course of activities of a purely private 
nature.
This provision is likely to be interpreted in the light of Lindqvist.” 
These changes took effect in January 2007.36  The misuse-orientated 
approach means that activities involving e-mail processing and 
internet publishing may be exempt from the PDA 1998, if it can be 
shown that it does not cause harm to the individual or more 
specifically, intrusion into their personal integrity.37  It principally 
applies to processing involving unstructured materials, such as 
running texts, sounds and images. Materials which are structured in 
order to significantly facilitate searches for or compilations of 
personal data, such as personal data registers and personal data-
related databases would still fall within the scope of the Personal 
Data Act 1998. 
What begins to emerge is a two-staged test as provided under the 
PDA 1998, whereby one would first consider the application of the 
PDA 1998 under s 6 (in the light of Lindqvist). If s 6 does not apply 
                                                
34  For a background into the Swedish Misuse-Orientated Approach, see
Ministry of Justice.  Data Protection 
(http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2771;jsessionid=aTUP2FKsfaba), Last accessed 
April 2007 and Swedish Personal Data Protection Act 
(http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/43/65/0ea2c0eb.pdf), Last accessed 
April 2007 and Bird and Bird. Proposal to amend the Swedish Personal Data Act –
the first steps towards a misuse-orientated legislation
(http://www.twobirds.com/english/publications/articles/Swedish_Personal_Data_A
ct.cfm), Dated 22 March 2006 and Wong, R, op. cit. n. 28.
35 The reference for the then bill is Prop 2005/06:173. Grateful 
acknowledgment to Mr Sőren Őman for this reference.  This can be found at 
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/06/08/09/2c0a24ce.pdf. 
36  Id..
37  “Personal integrity” is a question to be determined by the Swedish 
Courts. For a brief analysis, see also LEE A. BYGRAVE. DATA PROTECTION 
LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS, 2002, p. 129. 
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to internet activities, then one would then consider whether the 
activities (unstructured files) in question can be exempt from the 
misuse-orientated approach.  Although such a two-staged approach 
would appear cumbersome, it is a brave attempt by the Swedish 
Legislative Authorities to deal with the application of their data 
protection laws to the internet and this is particularly the case with 
the growth of blogs, podcasts and Web 2.0.  The adoption of a 
misuse-orientated approach is, but a short-term solution. Whether 
change can be made at a European level is less clear.38
A3 NORWAY
Although Norway is not part of the European Union (but part of the 
EEA), it has enacted data protection laws since 1978 with the first 
one being the Data Registers Act.39 The present data protection law is 
the Norwegian Personal Data Act 2000 (hereinafter “PDA”), which 
took effect on 1 January 2001.40 Prior to the Lindqvist decision, 
individuals were not prosecuted for publishing personal information 
on the internet if it can be shown that this was intended for private 
purposes.41 Private purposes were interpreted to include a number of 
websites which were set up for private purposes such as a hobby. 
However, this provision is in the process of being reviewed. Two 
experts, Professor Bygrave and Professor Schartum have written a 
report42 recommending changes to the existing Norwegian data 
                                                
38 Supra, note. 34.
39 For background reading into the Norwegian data protection law, see 
LEE A. BYGRAVE. DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS 
RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS, 2002; LEE A. BYGRAVE & A.H. AARǿ. 
“NORWAY” IN: M. HENRY (ED) INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY 
AND PERSONALITY LAWS (London: Butterworths, 2000), pp. 333-346 and 
PRIVIREAL. Norway (http://www.privireal.org/content/dp/norway.php), Last 
accessed March 2007.
40  See Norwegian Data Inspectorate. Personal Data Act 2000
(http://www.datatilsynet.no/templates/Page____194.aspx), Last accessed March 
2007.
41 See Dag W. Schartum. “Norway” In: PETER BLUME (ED.) NORDIC 
DATA PROTECTION, 2001, p. 104. 
42  The report is in Norwegian. 
(http://www.personvern.uio.no/pvpn/artikler/utredning_personopplysningsloven.pd
f),  Last accessed March 2007.
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protection law. One of the proposals is to amend the PDA so that is it 
in line with the Lindqvist decision. It is not clear whether these 
recommendations will be taken up, but already, the repercussions of 
the Lindqvist decision can be felt. 
A4 GERMANY43
The Federal Data Protection Act 2001 (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz44) 
implements the DPD and regulates federal government agencies and 
private bodies and State (Länder) data protection laws45 apply to 
their own public bodies. The relevant provision under the FDPA 
200146 is § 1, paragraph 3 which provides that: 
The Act shall apply to the collection, processing and use of personal data by:
Private bodies in so far as they process or use data by means of data 
processing systems or collect data for such systems, process or use 
data in or from non-automated filing systems or collect data for such 
systems, except where the collection, processing or use of such data 
is effected solely for personal or family activities (emphasis added).
                                                                                                                
43 Grateful acknowledgments to Dr Jőrg Hladjk, Hunton and Williams for 
his assistance.
44 Abbreviated “BDSG”. For a commentary into the German Data 
Protection Laws, see Simitis, S,
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, 6th Rev Ed, Baden-Baden, Nomos 2006; HERBERT 
BURKERT. Privacy/Data Protection: A German/European Perspective
(http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de/pdf_dat/burkert.pdf), Last accessed April 2007;
Flaherty, D. H. Protecting privacy in surveillance societies: the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada and the US, London: University of North
Carolina Press, 1989. The English translation of the Federal Data Protection Act 
(as of 15 November 2006) can be found 
at:http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln_029/nn_946430/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/Bu
ndesdatenschutzgesetz-
FederalDataProtectionAct,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Bundesdat
enschutzgesetz-FederalDataProtectionAct.pdf.
45  For a list of Länder data protection laws, this can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm#germany, 
Last accessed April 2007.
46 See also Spiros Simitis, supra., note. 47.
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A restrictive interpretation is applied to fulfil its obligations under 
international law.47  For example, processing was shown to be used 
exclusively for private purposes such as a personal electronic 
organiser. Furthermore, this provision would have to be construed in 
the light of Lindqvist.  An important distinction to be drawn is 
processing for personal and professional purposes. What is personal 
would depend on the general views of the society at the time.48  For 
instance, addresses, phone numbers, web addresses, e-mail 
addresses, birthdays of colleagues, other information regarding 
friends, relatives and so forth would all be regarded as personal if 
used for private purposes.  However, whilst it would be private, the 
distinctions are not always clear-cut when applied to the internet and 
this is particularly the case when we enter the realms of social 
networking (Web 2.0 etc.), a topic which is explored later.
Secondly, the German Telemedia Act 2007 (Telemediengesetz)49 has 
recently been enacted, replacing the Teleservices Data Protection Act 
and the Federal Media Services Treaty.50 This came into force on 
March 2007 and applies to electronic information and 
communication services including web pages, music download 
platforms, internet search engines and emails. The Act (“TMG” 
hereinafter) only applies to Germany and the effect of which 
(independent of the Federal Data Protection Act 2001) would 
generally apply to most webpages. In a presentation given by Dr 
Weichert,51 Head of the Centre for Data Protection in Schleswig-
Holstein, the view was that the Telemedia Act did not apply to 
private homepages (used for private and family purposes). 
                                                
47 Id..  Grateful acknowledgments to Dr Jőrg Hladjk for his views.  
48   Id..
49 Telemediengesetz (http://bundesrecht.juris.de/tmg/index.html), Last 
accessed May 2007. See Bygrave, L. A. Data protection law: approaching its 
rationale, logic and limits, 2002, pp. 328-329.
50 German Telemedia Act introduces new rules for new media
(http://www.twobirds.com/english/publications/articles/German_Tele_Media_Act_
new_rules.cfm), Dated 5 March 2007.
51Das neue Telemediengesetz – TMG
(https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/vortraege/20070423-weichert-tmg.pdf), 
Dated 23 April 2007.
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Notwithstanding this, there are problems in differentiating a webpage 
created by an individual maintained for private purposes and a 
webpage that formed part of a social networking website (for 
instance, registering on MySpace).  There is no definitive answer to 
this grey area. Whilst differences could be drawn between a webpage 
solely maintained by an individual (for private purposes) and 
webpages that formed part of a social networking website, and 
accessible to anybody such a distinction can, arguably, be taken to be 
simplistic of the structure of the internet.52    
The TMG draws also draws on definitions similar to the preceding 
law, the Teleservices Data Protection Act 199753 (hereinafter 
“TDDSG”) and regulates Telemedia services providers.54  Although 
the TMG retains the same definitions from the Teleservices Data 
Protection Act (application to “contractual data” (§ 14) and 
“utilisation data” (§ 15))55  there have been criticisms made against 
the TMG for not going as far as anticipated. For example, VoIP is 
covered under the German Telecommunications Act 2004,56 but not 
                                                
52 For a discussion about the internet, see also Laurence Lessig, CODE 
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, 1999 (also available at http://code-is-
law.org/); Andrew Murray. THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: 
CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT, Oxford, 2007 and JACK 
GOLDSMITH  & TIM  WU. WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? Oxford, 
2006. 
53 The English translation to the Teleservices Data Protection Act 1997 is 
available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/TDDSG.htm (but does not 
include the 2001 amendments – English translation is not available). However, the 
German version is available at http://www.artikel5.de/gesetze/tddsg.html (includes 
the 2001 amendments). For a brief background into the Teleservices Data 
Protection Act 1997, see Bygrave, L.A.  “German Teleservices Data Protection 
Act” (1998)  Privacy Law and Policy Reporter, Vol 5, pp. 53-54 at 
http://folk.uio.no/lee/oldpage/articles/Germany_TDPA.pdf.
54 See § 13 of the TMG, which sets out duties of Telemedia Service 
Providers.  
55 See Lee A. Bygrave. Supra, note 52.
56  See Telecommunications Act 2004 (TKG) at 
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln_030/nn_946430/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/Tele
communicationsAct-
TKG,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/TelecommunicationsAct-
TKG.pdf.
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so under the new TMG, whereas video streaming would, however, 
be covered under the TMG.  In short, the TMG is unlikely to apply to 
private webpages as maintained by individuals, but certainly, more 
clarity is needed when considering its application to websites that are 
not managed by private individuals but form part of social 
networking website such as MySpace etc. The key question to be 
asked is who is the “data controller”. By identifying who the data 
controller is, then it would be easier to determine who is required to 
adhere to the relevant data protection laws, before deciding whether 
this falls outside the scope of the Data Protection (either through Art. 
3(2) DPD as implemented under the DPD or under the exemptions 
under Art. 9 for special purposes or Art. 13 of DPD as implemented 
under corresponding data protection laws). 
B. Imbalance that exists in the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of individuals as set out in Art. 1.1 of the DPD such that the 
DPD appears to be heavily tilted towards the “protection of privacy” 
of an individual. Thus, leading to the encroachment of another’s right 
to express without being subject to the data protection laws (Art. 9 
leaves it to the discretion of Member States to derogate, but the 
ECJ’s ruling has left it to the national courts to decide)  If the literal 
interpretation of Art. 3.2 is applied, then it can have the consequence 
of being overprotective of an individual’s privacy when really his/her 
privacy is not being affected or misused. What is being argued here 
is that the protection of one’s right to have his or her personal 
information protected is also a restriction on another person’s right to 
express his or her views online.  Art. 1.1 of the DPD does not simply 
protect the privacy of an individual, but also the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of individuals including the freedom to expression.57  
C.  Question about what is “private” on the internet. The Lindqvist 
case redefines what is private on the internet. It has the undesirable 
effect of creating a public/private partition by placing an onus on 
individuals to limit access of their webpages, if they wanted to be 
exempted from Art. 3(2) of the DPD or corresponding data 
protection laws. Thus, it is arguable that the fostering of “social 
networking” and the communications between other individuals may 
                                                
57  See also Deryck Beyleveld.  Overview of Directive 95/46/EC
(http://www.privireal.org/content/dp/directivecommentary.php), Last accessed 
March 2007.
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be inhibited as a result of the Lindqvist decision. There is a further 
difficulty with determining the nexus group in which an individual 
may benefit. In other words, would an individual still be able to 
qualify under the exemption on the basis that his webpage reaches to 
those who are not necessarily family members? A narrow 
interpretation of Art. 3(2) of the DPD would take the approach of 
limiting access to a webpage to family members, but a broader view 
would include individuals other than family members. The scarcity 
of caselaw/precedent leaves this question open, but if one were to 
conform with the legislators’ original intentions, when the DPD was 
passed, then a limited interpretation would be preferred.
D. Anomaly of the Lindqvist decision because the ECJ took the view 
that the uploading of webpages does not constitute a transfer of 
personal data to third countries under Art. 25 of the DD. The ECJ 
was prepared, however, to construe Art. 3.2 narrowly.  We will 
discuss transborder data flows in section 4.1 of this paper.
E. The issue of “Personal Data”: The Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC takes a wider definition to “personal data”. Art. 2(a) 
defines “personal data” as ‘any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person 
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity (emphasis added).
Recital 26 of the DPD further provides that ‘whereas the principles 
of protection must apply to any information concerning an identified 
or identifiable person; whereas, to determine whether a person is 
identifiable, account should be taken of all the means likely 
reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person 
to identify the said person; whereas the principles of protection shall 
not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data 
subject is no longer identifiable.’
As discussed above, the wide definition58 means that personal 
information of cursory reference is likely to fall within the realm of 
                                                
58  The UK’s definition of “personal data” in Durant v FSA is not considered 
in this article. 
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the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which is also reflected in the 
ECJ’s decision in Lindqvist.59
We can make some preliminary observations. First, that varying 
approaches to the scope of Article 3(2) indicate an ongoing 
assessment of the standard setting role of DPD. Second, the 
discussions about the remit of the DPD and effective governance is 
particularly relevant to the present debate on the way information 
communication technologies are shaping our expectations about the 
way individuals view the Internet and issues relating to the 
management of their identity.  To be sure, issues concerning 
technological innovation and changing expectations of identity may 
render the seeming standard setting role under the DPD to appear 
inconsequential. We can now turn to a brief discussion of social 
networking spaces to highlight their technological and social 
significance so that their potential impact for DPD can be properly 
addressed.
IV. Social Networking Spaces
New technologies are now facilitating the creation of social spaces 
for interaction. The rise in media literacy, increased Internet 
penetration, and cheap broadband access have led to the growth of 
blogs, and websites for user-generated content like You-Tube. The 
evolving social ecosystem shows some of the ways technological 
innovation and end-to-end architecture is converging with emerging 
social attitudes towards information, identity and privacy. 
Information or data now becomes a resource to be used, recreated 
and shared. According to the Pew & Internet American Life Project, 
teenagers today are leveraging the interactive capabilities of the 
Internet to create and share their own media creations.60 Many 
individuals now upload videos, photos and digital images onto 
websites. Furthermore, individuals are now comfortable with the idea 
of archiving their interests or profiles online.61 It is common to find 
                                                
59 See also Douwe Korff. Supra, note. 88 – discussion of personal data as 
implemented by EU Member States.
60 See http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Content_Creation.pdf
(accessed 25th April, 2007).
61  See M Young, “Blogging: An Introductory Look at an Old Pastime in a 
New Medium” (2006) 23 Library Hi Tech News 27 - 28 
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blogs, which contain reflections, thoughts or observations on current 
affairs, lifestyle or personal interests.62 The contents as well as the 
quality of the blogs will vary depending on its authors.63 Some 
authors use blogs as communication spaces to meet other users with 
interests in sport, photography, food, entertainment or fashion. Some 
personal websites or blogs have podcasts which visitors to the site 
can download. Podcasts are MP3 audio recordings of interests. Some 
sites have photographs. Flickr, which has been recently acquired by 
Yahoo, enables individuals to share photos.64 Emerging social 
networking sites like Wallop taking the idea of self expression one 
stage further.65 As the information on the site states:66
Wallop is a new type of social networking site combined with a 
marketplace for buying and selling graphical effects called Wallop 
Mods for your profile. At Wallop we believe the next wave is all 
about self expression online similar to the ways we express ourselves 
in the real world by purchasing clothes, decorating a room or 
wearing jewelry. While Wallop is great for communicating with 
your friends, it is also a rich platform for Flash designers and content 
creators to develop Mods and make money doing it. We make it easy 
for you to design and create Mods that allow people to express 
themselves!67
                                                                                                                
http://callcentrediary.blogspot.com/ (a personal diary of a team manager at a call 
center)
62 Wikipedia Blog at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (accessed February 
15, 2007).
63  See generally R Wray, How one year's digital output would fill 161bn 
iPods,” Tuesday March 6,  
2007 http://technology.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,,2027327,00.html
64  Flickr (http://www.flickr.com/), Last accessed April 2007.
65 Wallop (http://www.wallopcorp.com/), Last accessed April 2007 and  
SubTV (www.SUB.tv), Last accessed April 2007.
66 Wallop Modder Network (http://designer.wallop.com/), Last accessed 
April 2007.
67 Id..
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Blogs are frequently used to debate cultural, religious or political 
issues. Others tend to be verging on more intimate activities.68 In the 
legal academy, blogs have become a popular avenue through which 
ideas are exchanged and disseminated. According to Technorati, the 
search engine blog directory, there are over 69 million blogs.69
Another example of the way individuals use and manage information 
is that of social networking sites like Bebo, MySpace, Lunarstorm.70
Blogs have evolved from being pure online diaries into social 
networks. Consider for example the social networking site 
Facebook.71 This site has search and browser facilities to enable an 
individual to find their friends or persons living in a particular area or 
studying at School, College, or University.72  Social networking sites 
have also begun to reflect commercial interests.73  
With the convergence of the multimedia and communication 
platforms, “moblogs” have enabled mobile phone users to use the 
mobile network to capture videos, take photographs and distributing 
text and media.74 As with blogs, moblogs frequently contain a 
biography of the author and a calendar to record when entries are 
made. Mobloggers post information to a moblog to communicate and 
record experiences, thoughts, opinions, news, events, or keep a diary. 
                                                
68  Belle de Jour (http://belledejour-uk.blogspot.com/) (a diary of a call girl 
in London), Last accessed April 2007.
69  Technorati (http://technorati.com/about/) (accessed  February 20, 2007) 
70  Pew & Internet American Life Report, Teen, Privacy & Online Social 
Networks (April 2007), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Privacy_SNS_Report_Final.pdf 
(accessed on 25th April 2007).
71 Facebook (http://www.facebook.com/), Last accessed April 2007.
72  Id..
73 W Roush, “Social Networking 3.0: The third generation of social-
networking technology has hit the Web, and it's about content as much as 
contacts.” 
http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=15908
(accessed, 1 March, 2007). Also S Finkelstein, Blogs are no longer free from 
everyday commercial, Thursday 15 February 2007 
pressureshttp://technology.guardian.co.uk/opinion/story/0,,2012801,00.html.
74 Moblogs (http://www.moblogs.com.au/)  and MMS Blogs  (www.mms-
blogs.com), Last accessed April 2007.
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Advances in the accessibility to, and quality of, media available 
allow users to post their entries via various formats i.e. text, digital 
photography, video and/or sound files.
These sites underscore the growing acceptance by individuals that 
social networking sites as environments for having fun, a social 
ecosystem for information sharing spaces and an opportunity to 
make connections with the wider community. 
We can draw some preliminary conclusions from this brief 
examination of the way individuals access new technologies and use 
information in the marketplace of ideas. First, individuals have a 
range of new technologies for accessing media and sharing 
information. Second, increased connectivity has also increased 
individuals exposure and immersion to information. Third, as 
individuals spend more time in the social spaces, we can detect a 
shift in cultural attitudes towards space, information, identity and 
privacy. Paradoxically, the concept of privacy is being shaped by the 
original idea behind the web – which is to create an environment for 
free flow of information. One clear illustration of the way the 
Internet is fulfilling its role in this context is the blurring of the space 
between public and private. For example, in the privacy of one’s 
home one could publish personal or private information online 
through a Blackberry, digital camera phones or wireless laptops. This 
is significant in the sense that data or information becomes a central 
part of the interactive process of creation, use and distribution. 
Fourth, society’s understanding and expectations about the ready 
availability and use of information is being gradually shaped by the 
new social ecosystem. In this respect, the terms of service policies 
often found in social networking sites represent a new form of 
negotiation taking place between data providers, data controllers and 
data subjects.
So how does this account complement the constitutional/regulatory 
paradigm of fairness and efficiency? A commencing point to an 
answer is that information is now readily accessible in the social 
ecosystem. The end-to-end architecture, the speed and scale of the 
technological innovation have provided much of the impetus for the 
free flow of information and content creation. Identity management 
and privacy considerations now compete with market expectations of 
choice, availability and efficiency. These considerations emphasise 
the importance of not isolating the DPD framework from the broader 
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relational dynamics between the individual and media. We are 
already witnessing some of the strategies being adopted that reflect 
the embryonic negotiation process being mediated by software code, 
contractual instrument and ideas about property. To put it another 
way, Article 3(2) issues are potentially being resolved through the 
social network spaces. For example, individuals subscribing to sites 
like Bebo, the host reminds its users that:
Whenever you voluntarily post personal information in public areas, 
like journals, webLogs, message boards, and forums, you should be 
aware that this information can be accessed by the public and can in 
turn be used by others to send you unsolicited communications. 
Please exercise discretion in deciding what information you 
disclose.75.
MySpace, for example has an indexing system that classifies 
communities through groups. For example, if an individual wanted to 
join a “private group” ie Article 3(2), that person would have to first 
become a member and login to MySpace. He would then  have the 
option of picking a group - http://groups.myspace.com/smiles - and 
then apply to join the group. On moderator approval he would have 
access to personal information not visible to non-members.
None of the above should however detract from the transborder 
issues or the dangers of personal information being posted on the 
Internet. In a recent article dealing with the data protection issues 
raised by blogs, it was observed that:76
Private facts are personal details about someone that have not been 
disclosed to the public. A person's sexual gender-preference, a sex-
change operation, and a private romantic liaison could all be private 
facts. Once publicly disclosed by that person, however, they move 
into the public domain. The Directive concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (2002/58/EC), Directive 95/46/EC on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data and Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights establish a Europe-wide set 
of legal principles for privacy protection which are enacted in all EU 
                                                
75 Id..
76 Sylvia Mercado-Kierkegaard. Blogs, lies and the doocing: The next 
hotbed of litigation? COMPUTER LAW AND SECURITY REPORT  22(2) 127-136
[2006].
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Member States and Council of Europe (CoE) Member States, 
respectively. The overall objective of the Directives is the protection 
of information privacy by Member States of the EU.77
Bloggers, who post photos from Flickr on their sites will be deemed 
to accept the privacy policies of their hosts or service providers. For 
example, Yahoo’s privacy policy permits bloggers on their site to 
specify whether or not they want their photographs to be accessible 
to the public, accessible to selected individuals or private.78 Of 
particular relevance is that Yahoo may use the photograph to target 
advertisements based on the metadata and notes associated with the 
photo that is made available or the search term entered. Individuals 
who are in the photos may be subjected to similar advertising 
schemes.
 Social networking spaces provide an apt illustration of how 
policymakers, industry and society are having to leverage the 
innovative and social potential of the Internet, and at the same time 
deal with regulatory implications for DPD. A brief summary will 
highlight the difficult policy questions and tradeoffs facing society.
A. Transborder Issues
Article 25(1) of the Directive 95/45/EC requires organisations 
transferring  personal data to countries outside the European Union 
to ensure an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms 
of those individuals whose personal data is being transferred. Some 
blogs may have material other than texts on its site. It may contain 
photos, videos, pictures and audios (podcasts). Note that in some 
web sites which host these sites, subscribers are deemed to agree to 
US law rather than EU law. 
From the analysis of Lindqvist, the ECJ holds that the uploading of 
webpages would not constitute the transfer of personal data as 
covered under Art. 25, because the provision was drafted at a time 
without contemplating this in mind. This does not mean that one 
                                                
77  Id..
78  Yahoo: Flickr
(http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/flickr/details.html), Last accessed April 
2007.
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would not be “processing” personal data as covered under the DPD, 
but that Art. 25 of the DPD would not, however, apply in the light of 
the Lindqvist ruling. 
Given, first, the state of development of the internet at the time 
Directive 95/46 was drawn up and, second, the absence, in Chapter 
IV, of criteria applicable to use of the internet, one cannot presume 
that the Community legislature intended the expression transfer [of 
data] to a third country to cover the loading, by an individual in Mrs 
Lindqvist's position, of data onto an internet page, even if those data 
are thereby made accessible to persons in third countries with the 
technical means to access them.  If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 
were interpreted to mean that there is transfer [of data] to a third 
country every time that personal data are loaded onto an internet 
page, that transfer would necessarily be a transfer to all the third 
countries where there are the technical means needed to access the 
internet. The special regime provided for by Chapter IV of the 
directive would thus necessarily become a regime of general 
application, as regards operations on the internet. Thus, if the 
Commission found, pursuant to Article 25(4) of Directive 95/46, that 
even one third country did not ensure adequate protection, the 
Member States would be obliged to prevent any personal data being 
placed on the internet.  Accordingly, it must be concluded that 
Article 25 of Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that 
operations such as those carried out by Mrs Lindqvist do not as such 
constitute a transfer [of data] to a third country. It is thus 
unnecessary to investigate whether an individual from a third 
country has accessed the internet page concerned or whether the 
server of that hosting service is physically in a third country. The 
reply to the fifth question must therefore be that there is no transfer 
[of data] to a third country within the meaning of Article 25 of 
Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State loads 
personal data onto an internet page which is stored with his hosting 
provider which is established in that State or in another Member 
State, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who connects 
to the internet, including people in a third country (emphasis 
added).79
B. Does the transborder transfer of personal data fall within the 
permitted derogations?
Two concerns can be identified. First, the principle of fairness. 
Second, that national governments set in place safety mechanisms for 
transborder transfer of personal data that are adequate. UK’s 
approach balances the requirements of fairness and efficiency by 
                                                
79  Lindqvist, Supra note. 11, at paras. 68-71.
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requiring data controllers to determine the appropriate levels of 
protection necessary to any particular circumstance. The conundrum 
here is a real one. How do we monitor and ensure that adequate 
levels of protection are maintained? Can or should contractual 
mechanisms imposed by web site operators and Internet Service 
Providers be relied upon to displace the safeguards set in place under 
the DPA?
C.  Blogs as “data processing” sites
Given the ease with which information can now be processed and the 
avenues for dissemination, there are some important issues. Many80
have commented on the potential employment and intellectual 
property issues, defamatory and hate speech issues and privacy. The 
Internet protocols enable data to assume a viral characteristic and 
control over the integrity and authenticity of information cannot be 
underestimated. There is an emerging practice of “counter-
Googling”.81 Visitors to a blog now use the information from the 
blog to find additional information about persons or events:
If consumers put their entire life stories online, and you as a 
company candidly refer to this public information AND make them 
an offer they can't refuse, more sales may be on the way. And 
bloggers, savvy consumers by nature, will no doubt introduce a 'no 
unsolicited sales' seal, the moment they grow tired of COUNTER-
GOOGLING, making it clear what's off limits and what's fair 
game.82
                                                
80 This is not an exhaustive list, but see also DANIEL SOLOVE.  A TALE 
OF TWO BLOGGERS: FREE SPEECH AND PRIVACY IN THE 
BLOGOSPHERE, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 207, May 7, 
2006 and Ribstein, L.B. “From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of 
Amateur Journalism” WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW,(2006) Vol. 48, p. 
185 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=700961), Last accessed 
April 27, 2007 and Vine, S. “Blogs, blawgs and legal issues” (2004) EBL 6(8) 7-9.
81  A Hill, This week we want to know all about... Counter-Googling, Sunday 
February 11, 2007 http://technology.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329712441-
117802,00.html.
82  Trendwatching.com. Counter-googling
(http://www.trendwatching.com/trends/2003/09/COUNTER-GOOGLING.html), 
Last accessed April 27, 2007.
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More importantly, can both web hosts and individuals who have blog 
or social networking sites be deemed to be “data controllers”? Who 
must be responsible for “processing”?83 The point here is that 
individuals, albeit using it for personal purposes are reliant on 
commercial intermediaries to deal with the technical functionality. In 
the light of the applicable principles of fairness that provide an 
overarching framework, it could be argued that both sets of parties 
may be held accountable under the DPD.
D. Exemptions
D1 Balancing rights of expression and rights of privacy
Art. 9 of the DPD enables Member States to provide for ‘exemptions 
or derogations from the provision…where this was carried out solely 
for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary 
expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy 
with the rules governing freedom of expression.’ 
The transposition of this provision by EU Member States has not 
been entirely consistent (ie. that each Member State have transposed 
this provision differently)84, but the ECJ was clear to emphasize that 
personal data does not conflict with the freedom of expression even 
though it may be difficult to balance the competing interests (rights 
of expression and rights of privacy).  In a Swedish case, Ramsbro,85
an individual had posted details of bank officials on the website. The 
purpose behind the website was to alert individuals of unscrupulous 
banks and unethical network-capitalists. Much of the material on the 
                                                
83  Art. 2(d) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC broadly defines a 
“data controller” as ‘the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means 
of the processing of personal data…’ and therefore, in the light of this definition, 
individuals could also be regarded as “data controllers” who process personal 
information (see Lindqvist decision as an example). 
84  See DOUWE KORFF. STUDY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DATA 
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE – COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF NATIONAL 
LAWS, 
(http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/lawreport/consultation/univesse
x-comparativestudy_en.pdf) Dated May 16 2003, pp. 130-137.
85  Ramsbro B-293-00, June 2001 at p. 11.
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website had contained personal information which was described to 
be of an insulting nature.  The Swedish Supreme Court had to weigh 
the balance between the protection of an individual’s privacy and an 
individual’s freedom of expression and took into account, the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
The Swedish Supreme Court held that:
The fact that electronic or other media published texts contain 
insulting or deprecating data or judgments does not mean that this 
takes away its character of journalistic purpose. On the contrary such 
a fact is to be looked upon as a normal ingredient within the scope of 
a critical societal debate. As the European Court of Human Rights 
has stated, the freedom of information also includes the right to 
present such an expression and such opinions and thoughts which 
insult, shock or disturb…The limitation to “solely” journalistic 
purposes [as provided under the Personal Data Act 1998] alludes 
firstly to make clear that a processing of personal data, which takes 
place in the mass media and by journalists for other than journalistic 
purposes are outside the limitation. The processing by mass media of 
personal data, for instance for factoring, advertising or mapping of 
reader’s profiles, thus falls outside the limitation…Any support for 
an idea that the expression “solely” should be interpreted as meaning 
that it, independent of the fact that publishing has had journalistic 
purposes, should be possible, on the basis of the Act on Personal 
Data, to penalize an attack on someone else’s good name and 
reputation cannot be considered to exist.86
The question is how do we balance the freedom of expression and 
the right to privacy in the blog? For example:87
Stella, my eighties style yuppie witch of a team leader, has spun 
herself into a frenzy of hyperactivity.  She has been working, in her 
own words, “like a bastard mad hard working bastard mega-bitch,” 
adding that as long as her friend Becky is away in China, she might 
as well immerse herself in work, “because what else is there?”
I pondered this for a split-second, before she answered that it’s all 
about incentives. She’s made it her goal to take Becky sausage 
tasting on her return from foreign shores. She wants to prove to her 
that we can live the high life here in Preston just as well as any 
bunch of Beijing bankers.88
                                                
86 Id..
87 A free man in Preston (http://afreemaninpreston.blogspot.com/), Last 
accessed April 27, 2007.
88 Id..
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In this example, if no one can identify who the person is, then it is 
not likely to fall within the scope of the Directive. However, if it can 
be identified who these individuals are, then this would fall within 
the scope of the Directive (personal data adopting a wider definition 
according to Art. 2(a) DPD). The question is whether this would fall 
outside the scope Art. 3(2) DPD?  Applying a narrow interpretation, 
then Art. 3(2) is unlikely to apply. If steps are taken by an individual 
such that the webpage was not available in the public domain, there 
may be an arguable case that it was intended for private purposes. 
If one were to apply the UK’s definition of personal data, then it is 
possible to contend that one did not intend to process “personal data” 
as defined by the UK Court of Appeal because such data would have 
to be more than biographical. However, as argued above, such a 
definition is unlikely to rest comfortably with the Lindqvist decision. 
V. CONCLUSION
The primary argument in this paper is that a proper assessment of the 
scope of Article 3(2) and its standard setting function cannot be 
divorced from social and technological innovations encountered in 
the Internet. Social networking sites provide an apt example of the 
way the convergence of technological innovation and society’s 
expectations is challenging orthodox understanding of privacy and 
the ability of regulatory institutions to regulate the activities of data 
controllers. From the perspective of individuals who subscribe to 
social networking sites, the issue of whether Article 3(2) should or 
should not be extended may appear to be inconsequential. The 
growth of blogs and podcasts raise potential challenges to the 
existing European data protection framework and national data 
protection laws.89 The Lindqvist decision highlights the tensions that 
exist with protecting the privacy of an individual on the one hand and 
the freedom of expression of the other. If the data protection laws are 
to evolve in a coherent and principled manner, there is a clear need to 
adopt a broader perspective of data governance and integrate 
                                                                                                                
89  By this, we are referring to EU Member States that have implemented the 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.
Forthcoming John Marshall Journal of Computer and Information Law 2007/8
33
businesses and consumers into the regulatory process. It is only when 
we recognise the paradox of new technology, its significance for the 
way society views privacy will we avoid the dangers identified in the 
Bangemann Report.90 Art. 3(2) need to be rethought. 
Europe leads the world in the protection of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual with regard to the processing of 
personal data. The application of new technologies potentially affects 
highly sensitive areas such as those dealing with the images of 
individuals, their communication, their movements and their 
behaviour. With this in mind, it is quite possible that most Member 
States will react to these developments by adopting protection, 
including trans-frontier control of new technologies and services.
                                                
90 Europe and the Global Information Society: Bangemann report 
recommendations to the European Council
(http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=18174), Last accessed May 2, 2007.
